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JURISDICTION
Respondents, Garfield County Defendants, agree with
the statement of jurisdiction contained in Petitioner's brief•
Respondents will not in this brief restate the jurisdiction of
the Court to hear this appeal.
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal by Appellant, Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Co., is from a Decision and Summary Judgment
upholding the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated §17-19-15.
Said Decision was premised upon the Court's conclusion that Utah
Code Annotated, 17-19-15 was a state-wide tax enacted by the
Utah Legislature to fund the state-wide purpose of achieving
uniformity and equality of assessment of property taxes by
establishing a funding mechanism to provide for the uniform
state-wide administration of the assessment, collection and
distribution of property taxes.

The Court further ruled that

since the state-wide uniform levy was a tax, and Appellant had
conceded in the trial court that it was a tax, Appellants' 4th,
5th, 6th, 7th and 8th claims for relief, which were premised
upon the assertion that the taxes were in fact a regulatory fee
rather than a tax, were also dismissed.
The Decision and Summary Judgment were issued by the
Honorable Don v. Tibbs, Judge of the Sixth Judicial District
Court, and were duly entered on the 14th day of October, 19 88.
(R-238-247.)

Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on Novem-

ber 10, 1988.

(R248-249.)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
1.

Whether or not it is constitutionally permissible for

1

the Utah State Legislature to pass a law to address the statewide concern of achieving equality and uniformity of property
taxation in the State of Utah.
2.

Whether or not a legislatively established uniform,

equalized statewide tax levy to fund property tax administration
in each of the 29 counties of Utah is a valid exercise of
legislative authority in pursuit of a remedy for a state-wide
problem.
3.

Whether or not the uniform state-wide tax levy is a

violation of Appellant's right of due process because the
revenues derived from the l e w exceed the cost of collecting its
particular taxes.
4.

Whether or not the Plaintiff has standing to challenge

the effect of the Uniform State-wide Tax Levy upon Garfield
County.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INCLUDED
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: (See Exhibit 1.)
STATUTORY PROVISIONS;

(See Exhibit 1.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1986, the general legislative session of the Utah
State Legislature, in response to representatives of local
governmental entities as well as the state and local school
boards, enacted into law Section 17-19-15, Utah Code Annotated.
The statute was passed to address the concern for compliance
with the constitutional requirement that all tangible property
be taxed at a uniform and equal rate.
lished an equalized

Section 17-19-15 estab-

statewide levy to pay for the cost of

2

assessing, collecting and distributing ad valorem property tax
revenues.
The statute was first applied in 1987 and again in
1988.
Appellant paid its 1988 property taxes under protest
and thereafter filed a complaint for refund in the district
court of Garfield County claiming the statute to be unconstitutional.

The county defendants (Respondents herein) filed an

answer and moved for summary judgment.

Plaintiff (Appellant

herein) filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

The district

court determined that the statute was constitutional in all
respects and granted summary judgment to the Defendants.
Plaintiff appealed to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents object to the "Statements of Facts" set
forth in Appellant's Brief.

Said statement contains argument,

conclusions and assumptions.

It also contains erroneous factual

assertions and conclusions which are not supported by the record
before the trial court or this Court on Appeal.

For example:

at page 5, Appellant made the unsupported conclusionary statement that the "Act promotes inefficient and costly tax collection procedures."

There are no facts to support this conclu-

sion in the record, and indeed Appellants have cited no portion
of the record as support for this bald assertion.

Appellant

further asserts that "Every conceivable expense that can be
denominated a "collection cost" has been so labelled in order to
obtain the largest possible slice of the Section 17-19-15 pie."
There are no facts in the record to support this statement.
3

It

is nothing more than unsupported argument paraded as a fact by
the Appellant without any evidence cited to support such a
conclusion.
Appellant

in its purported

fact statement

states

"Assessment and collection costs have increased nearly five fold
in Davis County—from $329,695 in 1985 to $1,540,923 in 1987."
There is no evidence in the record to support this statement.
Appellant's complaint, at Exhibit D (R-40) contained a schedule.
However, Respondents denied the validity of the schedule and
Appellants never produced
schedule.

The

or identified

uncontroverted

affidavit

the source of the
of

Brent

Gardner

(R-202-210) shows that for 1985 Davis County, in fact, budgeted
$1,293,996, in 1985 as the costs of assessing and collecting.
Rather than the $329,695. claimed by Appellant.

Therefore, the

uncontroverted evidence established that the increase between
1985 and 1987 in Davis County was not "five fold" as erroneously
stated by Appellant but, in fact, increased by only 16% over the
two year period or an average of less than 8% per year rather
than the 500% asserted by Appellant.

On page 8 of Appellants1

opening brief the following representations are made concerning
the Attorney General's position on the challenged
Appellant, in part, states:

statute.

"...an Attorney General's opinion

dated February 11, 1988, which found that the Act was unconstitutional. ..."
The original letter is on the inside cover of the
record, unnumbered

but dated August 26, 1988.

identified as Exhibit "A" in Appellant's brief.

It is also
The last

sentence of the last complete paragraph on page 1 reads as
follows:
bind

"The opinion is an analysis that does not purport to

the Court and

is not an unequivocal

declaration

of

constitutionality or unconstitutionality."

(Emphasis supplied.)

It should be noted that the letter is signed by the same person
who wrote the opinion.

Again, Appellant has made a misstatement

to the Court.
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Except for the limited role of the State Tax Commission in assessing certain multi-county or specifically described
properties, valuation for ad valorem taxation is accomplished in
the State of Utah through local county officials in each of the
twenty-nine counties.
Historically, the State Legislature and the State Tax
Commission have played a significant role in all local assessment issues.
S.B. 151 (Codified into Utah Code Annotated, 17-19-15),
was passed in the 1986 general session by the Utah State Legislature.

(R-36-38.)
The purpose of the legislation was to provide a

funding mechanism to address a matter of state-wide concern in
each of the individual counties to wit:

the accurate, equitable

and fair assessment of locally assessed residential, commercial
and industrial properties as well as the effective and efficient
collection of ad valorem property tax revenues.

(R-96.)

Prior to the passage of the challenged statute there
had been seven consecutive years of litigation by railroads
claiming that local commercial and industrial properties were
under-assessed.

(R-96.)

In each of the previous four years the Utah State Tax
Commission had issued orders directing certain counties in Utah
5

to increase assessment levels and at least five lawsuits had
been filed by the Utah State Tax Commission against local county
assessors claiming under-assessment of locally assessed properties within their respective counties,

(R-96.)

While the statute required the State Auditor to set
forth categories of costs uniform throughout the State to be
utilized by county commissions or councils in budgeting for the
cost of assessing, collecting and distributing ad valorem tax
revenues, the final tax rate was to be determined by the Utah
State Tax Commission from the aggregated budget total for all
counties established by the State Auditor.

However, the setting

of the county budget, the controlling of costs through the
budget process and the expenditure of funds was intended to and
did remain the responsibility of the Board of County Commissioners or council.

(R-97.)

The Utah Association of Counties, by formal resolution
in November of 1987, expressed its support for the provisions of
S.B. 151 and opposed any attempt to amend or repeal its provisions.

In January of 1988 all 29 counties of the State of

Utah unanimously expressed their support for the provisions of
S.B. 151 including the revenue sharing provisions contained in
the Act and again opposed any attempts to repeal or amend its
provisions.

(97.)

The Utah State Office of Education, the Utah Association of Counties, the Utah School Boards Association as well
as the Utah League of Cities and Towns, determined that the
equalized levy contained in S.B. 151 was a positive solution to

6

the problem of payment for assessing and collecting taxes•
(R-99.)
The undisputed facts show that the cost of assessing
and collecting all ad valorem taxes in the State of Utah after
the passage of S.B. 151 increased by approximately 14% between
1985 and 1987 or an average of only 7% per year.

In Davis

County for example, the increase over the two year period
between 1985 and 1987 was an approximate total of 16% for an
average increase of less than 8% per year for the two years in
question.

(R-202-208.)
In 1986 and again in 1987 Respondent, Garfield County

fully noticed and held public hearings concerning its proposed
budgets for the years 1987 and 1988. Public inspection of each
proposed budget during normal working hours was invited.

The

official records of the public hearings indicate that neither
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company nor any person
identifying themselves as a representative of said company
appeared at the public hearings on the 1987 and 1988 budget.
(R-217-233.)
The Garfield County Commission adopted its budget for
1987 and 1988. Each budget separately accounted for and included all costs associated with the assessing, collecting and
distributing of taxes.

The Garfield County Commission volun-

tarily consented to and approved the revenue sharing between and
among the several counties of the State for 1987 and 1988.
(R-224.225.)
On May 20, 1988, Appellant filed a complaint against
Garfield County seeking a refund of taxes paid under protest and
7

a declaration that Utah Code Annotated Sections 17-19-15 was
unconstitutional.

(R-l-17.)

The Garfield County Defendants filed an answer and
thereafter Appellant and Respondent both sought summary judgment.

After allowing appropriate time for briefing by both

parties, the Court heard argument and on the 14th of October,
1988, the Court issued its decision that Utah Code Annotated
Section 17-19-15 was constitutional in all respects.

Judgment

of no cause of action was entered in favor of Respondents and
against Appellant.

(R-238-247.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Section 17-19-15, Utah Code Annotated was the result
of several years of efforts on the part of local government,
local school boards, the Tax Commission and the Utah legislature
to resolve the statewide concern for equal and uniform valuation
of property for all ad valorem property taxation.

To provide

the necessary funding to address that statewide concern, the
legislature adopted a funding mechanism similar to the one
employed for the State Uniform School Fund.

That mechanism was

a separate equalized statewide tax levy based upon the actual
budgeted costs of assessing, collecting and distributing property tax revenues within each of the 29 counties of the State.
The funding mechanism employed was a valid exercise of legislative authority in pursuit of a remedy for a statewide problem.
The procedures

established

by Section 17-19-15, Utah Code

Annotated are consistent with the authority set forth in the
Utah Constitution for the legislature and the Utah State Tax
Commission.

The procedures set forth in the challenged statute
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are also in keeping with the interpretative decisions of the
Utah Supreme Court and do not violate any provisions of the
United States or the State of Utah.
Appellant and Respondents both submitted that matter
to the trial court for summary judgment.

The overarching issue

presented by both motions was the constitutionality of Section
17-19-15, Utah Code Annotated.

Since Appellant and Respondents

had each filed motions for summary judgment, each had concluded
that the legal issue of the constitutionality of Section 17-19-15
was ripe for final determination.

This Court's decision on that

issue will be a final disposition of the entire case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SENATE BILL NO. 151, (CODIFIED AT UTAH CODE
ANN. §17-19-15) DULY ENACTED BY THE 1986
LEGISLATURE, IS PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL AS A
VALID LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT DESIGNED TO
PROMOTE EFFICIENT STATEWIDE PROPERTY TAX
ASSESSMENT, COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION.
The Appellant seeks to have this Court find the Act
violative of various provisions of the United States and Utah
Constitutions.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed

judicial restraint in finding any duly enacted
decision unconstitutional.

legislative

Enactments must be read in a light

favoring constitutionality with an effort made to resolve any
doubts in favor of the statute.

This principle was clearly

stated in some detail in Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers,
197 P.2d 477, 499 (Utah, 1948).
It is well settled in this state, as elsewhere, that the courts will not declare a
statute unconstitutional unless it clearly and
manifestly violates some provision of the

9

Constitution of the state or of the United
States. Every presumption must be indulged in
favor of the constitutionality of an act, and
every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of
its validity. The whole burden lies on him
who denies the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. If by any fair interpretation
of the statute the legislation can be upheld,
it is the duty of this court to sustain it,
even though judges may view the act as inopportune or unwise; and it is not within the
province of the judiciary to question the
wisdom of the motives of the Legislature in
the enactment of the statute. The provision
in question was regularly passed by the
Legislature and approved by the governor. The
presumption should be and is in favor of
validity. It must be assumed that the legislative department, whose members pledge
themselves by oath to support the Constitution, has not lightly disregarded that pledge.
The Court elaborated upon this theme of presumptive constitutionality in Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 236

(Utah 1979),

emphatically stating that legislative enactments were presumed
constitutional and that particular deference should be accorded
enactments that were primarily economic in nature.

In a 1984

case the Court affirmed its previous decisions and also stated
that "the presumption of constitutionality applies with particular force to tax statutes."

Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County,

681 P.2d 184, 190-191, (Utah, 1984).

It is also presumed that

all legislative enactments are the result of the considered
opinions of the state's duly elected and representative lawmakers.

To find any statute unconstitutional, the court must

find that no reasonable reading of the statute permits a finding
of constitutionality.

The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 285

P.1001, 1004 (Utah, 1930).

If any fair reading of the statute

permits a constitutional interpretation, the Court must uphold

10

it.

It is against this strong presumption that the statutory

scheme discussed below must be analyzed.
POINT II
A. THE BACKGROUND TO THE ACT AND THE EXTENSIVE HISTORY OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN AND
CONTROL OVER THE AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX
SYSTEM ESTABLISH A STATE PURPOSE IN FUNDING
AND OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM.
Except for the limited role of the State Tax Commission in assessing certain multi-county or specifically designated properties, valuation for ad valorem taxation is accomplished
in the State of Utah through local county officials in each of
the twenty-nine counties.

To suggest, however, that because

functions are reposed within the statutory portfolios of locally
elected officials and financed partially or totally by county
general fund revenues they are purely local functions, ignores
the significant historical role which the State Legislature and
State Tax Commission have played in all local assessment issues.
Article XIII, Section 11, Constitution of Utah, establishes a
State Tax Commission and provides specifically that:
"under such regulations in such cases and
within such limitations as the Legislature may
prescribe it shall review proposed bond
issues, revise the tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize the assessment and
valuation of property within the counties."
(Emphasis added.)
The same constitutional provision gives the State Tax
Commission power to regulate and control local County Boards of
Equalization and local elected officials with respect to taxation matters.

Utah Code Ann. §59-1-710, 1953, as amended,

grants sweeping control to the Tax Commission over local county
taxing matters.

Specifically, it may

11

"adopt rules and

policies...to govern county boards and officers in the performance of any duty relating to assessment, equalization and
collection of taxes" [§59-1-210 (3)] , "prescribe the use of forms
relating to the assessment of property and the equalization of
those assessments" [§59-1-210(4)], and "administer and supervise
the tax laws of the state" [§59-1-210(5)].

Additionally it may:

"exercise general supervision over assessors
and county boards of equalization and over
other county officers in the performance of
their duties relating to the assessment of
property and collection of taxes so that all
assessments of property are just and equal,
according to fair market value, and that the
tax burden is distributed without favor or
discrimination"
[§59-1-210(7)].
It may "confer with, advise and direct county treasurers, assessors and other county officers in matters relating to
the assessment and equalization of property for taxation and the
collection of taxes" [§59-1-210(9)].

As part of its

investigative responsibility the Commission is charged with the
power to:
"investigate and direct the work and methods
of local assessors and other officials in the
assessment, equalization, and taxation of
property, and to ascertain whether the law
requiring the assessment of all property not
exempt from taxation, and the collection of
taxes, have been properlv administered and
enforced." [§59-1-210 (19)].
Finally, to enforce its complete supervisory control over the
local property tax process it may "cause complaints to be made
in the proper court seeking removal from office of assessors,
auditors, members of county boards and other assessing, taxing,
or disbursing officers who are guilty of official misconduct or
neglect of duty" [§59-1-210(12)].
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This comprehensive grant of regulatory authority and
state control over all assessment and collection practices
within the counties of the State is also evidenced by several
specific statutory enactments relating to the performance of
those duties.

Chapter 2 of Title 59, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as

amended) provides a comprehensive statutory framework with
regard to time frames, procedures, standards and methods under
which local assessors, treasurers, auditors, and County Boards
of Equalization must function.

The Legislature and Tax Commis-

sion have, to a large degree, completely assumed control of the
local administration of the property tax system.
Consistent with the Constitutional requirement for the
fair, equitable and accurate assessment of all property in the
State (Utah Const. Art. XIII §3), the Tax Commission has been
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to equalize the
valuations of the various counties for purposes of guaranteeing
equitable assessment levels in financing the Uniform School
Fund.

The revenues of that fund are derived to a large degree

from a uniform statewide tax levy imposed by local school
districts.

To further state equalization and uniformity of

assessment, the Utah State Legislature, in 1969, established
comprehensive programs of assessor certification and examination
and a statewide re-appraisal program with costs to be shared
between counties and the State Tax Commission.

This program was

designed to provide for re-appraisal of all taxable property in
each county every five years on a county-by-county basis.

The

Legislature also implemented a program of personal property
auditing conducted by the State Tax Commission with cost sharing
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by the counties.

See generally, Laws of Utah 1969, Chapter 179,

Section 1 through 6,

[Codified as Utah Code Ann, §59-5-106

through 111 (1953, as amended)].
In 1981, the re-appraisal program created in 1969 was
repealed by the Utah State Legislature, (Laws of Utah 1981,
Chapter 233, Section 2.)

In its place was substituted a compre-

hensive program of sales-assessment ratio studies to be conducted by the State Tax Commission.
certification

of county

The provisions relating to

assessors, education

and

training

programs conducted by the Tax Commission, personal property
audits and assessment-sales ratio studies are currently codified
at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-701 through 705

(1953, as amended.)

With respect to the assessment-sales ratio responsibility of the
State Tax Commission, Utah Code Ann. §59-2-704(2)

(1953, as

amended) provides, in pertinent part, that upon completion of
the study by the Tax Commission:
(2) "The commission shall, on or before the
4th Tuesday of November of each even-numbered
year, order each county to adjust or factor
its assessment rates using the most current
studies so that the assessment rate in each
county is in accordance with that prescribed
in Section 59-2-103.
The adjustment or
factoring may include an entire county,
geographical areas within a county, and
separate classes of properties. Where significant value deviations occur, the commission
shall also order corrective action."
Accordingly as part of the comprehensive State policy
with respect to equal and uniform assessments, the Tax Commission has been given authority to order adjustments to values and
even order corrective action

(re-appraisal) when significant

value deviations occur.
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Finally, as part of its effort to guarantee accuracy
of assessment for purposes of equality within the equalized tax
levy supporting the Uniform School Fund, the Legislature in 1977
(Laws of Utah, 1977, Chapter 22, Sections 1 through 4) provided
that uniform minimum standards for real property plat maps used
by counties for property tax assessments would be established by
a separate committee chaired by a member of the State Tax
Commission.

The statutes provide that all plat maps prepared by

local elected county recorders and assessors must conform to
those standards and that the counties would be reimbursed for
the cost of correcting existing plats.

The importance of this

activity and its relevance to the support of the Uniform School
Fund were deemed sufficient to justify the enactment of Utah
Code Ann. §59-5-114, now codified at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-318
(1952, as amended), which stated:
Cost of preparation of revised plats are to be
borne by the Commission and appropriated from
the Uniform School Fund to the Property Tax
Division of the Commission for distribution to
the various counties... (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Legislature clearly established that equality of assessment between counties was of such statewide concern
that an equalized statewide levy should be used to pay for the
services.

This financing mechanism is identical to that chal-

lenged by the plaintiffs in the instant case.
The Act presented for the court's review is the
culmination of five years of concerted legislative activity and
litigation by cities, school districts and counties.

See

generally Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030
(Utah 1983) , and Boards of Education of Granite, Murray and Salt
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Lake School Districts v. Salt Lake County Commission, et al.,
749 P. 2d 1264 (Utah, 1988.)

In an attempt to resolve and/or

eliminate continuing litigation over the apportionment of the
costs of assessing, collecting and distributing property taxes,
the statewide financing mechanism currently under attack in the
instant case was duly enacted by the 1986 Utah State Legislature
as S.B. 151. The method of financing an effective and economic
statewide system of property tax assessment, collection and
distribution was closely modeled on the financing mechanism for
the State supported minimum school program
Fund).

(Uniform School

See Utah Code Ann. §53-7-1 et seq. (1953, as amended.)
Under the uniform statewide tax administration levy,

local county governing bodies establish budgets for assessing,
collecting and distributing property taxes, categorize those
costs in the uniform budgeting categories adopted by rule by the
State Auditor, and impose as a local levy a uniform statewide
tax rate sufficient to finance the aggregated budgets submitted
by the 29 counties.

If, in any county, the levy for tax admin-

istration purposes generates an amount in excess of the amount
budgeted by the Board of County Commissioners for that county,
the excess funds transmitted to the State Treasurer for re-distribution to counties like Garfield County where the tax rate
was insufficient to generate the amount required for the tax
administration system.

County commissions are free to budget

and expend whatever funds they deem necessary to accomplish the
operation of the property tax administration system.

In the

event the expenditures are not within one of the uniform categories adopted and approved by the State Auditor, the County
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governing body retains the authority to provide for the expenditure from other county revenues.
The utilization of an equalized statewide levy approved during the 1986 general legislative session was a deviation from the previous authority of each county to levy a
separate tax

for the cost of assessing, collecting and dis-

tributing property taxes.

The equalized levy was in specific

recognition of the significant differences in property tax
valuation throughout the 29 counties.

Many counties such as

Garfield County, possess insufficient tax base to fully fund the
cost of property tax assessment, collection and distribution
with the tax rate authorized by the Legislature for that purpose.

The utilization of an equalized tax rate was an attempt

to minimize the negative impact of this disparity in taxing
capability.

As a solution it received the unanimous support of

the cities, counties and school districts which are the three
major groups previously been involved in litigation over these
same issues.

(See Affidavit attached hereto of Brent Gardner, R

94-99.)
It is against this background that the present Act,
codified as Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15 (1953, as amended), must be
analyzed.

The present Act is the Legislature's considered

solution to the need for an equalized, efficient mechanism to
pay for the costs of a statewide property tax assessment,
collection and distribution system.
B. THE ACT AND THE TAX LEVY IMPOSED THEREUNDER ARE IN FURTHERANCE OF A STATEWIDE PUBLIC
PURPOSE AND THUS DO NOT VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XIII, §5.
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Appellants claim the Act violates Utah Const. Art.
XIII, §5 by allowing the Legislature to impose taxes for County
purposes, by granting the State Auditor excessive control over
local budgetary
property

tax

decisions and by

revenues

with

each

forcing

Counties to share

other.

In

construing

the

statute it must be read so as to give effect to the Legislative
purpose utilizing the plain meaning of the statutory language.
The statute under attack is a funding mechanism designed, after
many years and several attempts, to achieve a reasonable, efficient and equalized system of paying for the costs of assessing,
collecting and distributing property taxes.

The Act unequivo-

cally provides that "to promote appraisal and equalization...and
effective collection and distribution of property tax proceeds,"
proper

officials,

based

upon

reasonable

economic

assumptions, must levy a tax uniformly statewide.

data

and

As has been

previously set forth for this Court's consideration, the mechanism employed by this Act is not an aberration.

Other statutes

resolve similar statewide concerns through funding mechanisms
that reallocate revenues between local entities. As an example,
the statewide Uniform School Fund levy also appears as a local
levy on property tax notices.

Utah Code Ann. §53-7-17, §53-7-18,

and §59-2-904 (1953, as amended).
Appellant's challenges to the Act rely extensively on
several Utah Supreme Court decisions issued between 1901 and
1936.

State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66).1061 (1901); State

v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P.337 (1904); Bailey v. VanDyke, 66
Utah 184, 240 P.242 (1925); The Best Foods v. Christensen, 285
P.1001 (Utah 1930); Smith v. Carbon County, 63 P.2d 259 (Utah
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1936).

These early cases are distinguishable from the case at

bar both

factually and legally.

Additionally, several recent

cases have significantly diminished the relevance of the earlier
authority in assessing the constitutionality of funding mechanisms authorized by the Legislature as in the public interest—
especially where matters of statewide concern are involved.
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp. y 540 P. 2d 499

(Utah 1975); Salt

Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d

1339

(Utah

1979); U.T.F.C. V. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986); City of
West Jordan, et al. v. Utah State Retirement Board, et al, 98
Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah, 1988).

See also A. Lynn Jr., "Finan-

cing Modernized and Unmodernized Local Government in the Age of
Aquarius," 1971 UTAH L.REV.30.

Under this latter line of cases,

the funding mechanism established by the Act is clearly constitutional.

Finally, the clear distinctions between the statutory

mechanism set out in the Act and those described as defective in
earlier cases support validation even under the earlier strict
construction of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5.
In State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P.1061 (1901)
the Legislature imposed upon counties the requirement of hiring
and paying a pre-selected fruit tree inspector.
performed

duties

under

the

direction

horticulture and had the unrestricted
uties.

of

the

This employee
state

authority

board

of

to hire dep-

In striking down the Act, the Court held that it imper-

missibly usurped county administrative authority, created county
debt without county consent, violated the constitutional prohibition against imposing a local tax for the solely local purpose,

lacked

uniformity

of

operation,
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and

lacked

a

state

purpose.

There was no statement of state purpose in the act

under review.

The Court recognized the state possessed clear

authority to impose taxes for state purposes.

1^3. at 1062.

Substantial differences exist between the current Act
and the scheme addressed by the Standford court.

In the instant

case, county employees, subject to the control of county officials, continue to perform their statutorily imposed responsibilities.
control.
funding

Budgets

expenditures

remain

under

county

Tax rates are applied uniformly statewide, and the
mechanism

purpose.

and

furthers

a comprehensive

Uniform and efficient property

statewide public

tax assessment and

collection were the same goals sought by the earlier state
funded reappraisal and assessment plat review programs and are
the precise public policy objectives articulated by the legislature in the body of the current act.
Three years

later, the Court again considered

application of Article XIII Section 5 to a legislative act.

the
In

State v. Eldredga, 76 P.337 (Utah 1904), the Legislature authorized the State Board of Equalization to assess or value
certain property situated wholly within one county.
was constitutionally vested in county officials.
of the statute authorizing
property

situated

This duty

That portion

state assessment or valuation of

or operated wholly within one county was

severed and voided.

No fair reading permitted upholding that

portion in light of the specific Constitutional limitation of
Utah Const. Art. XIII, §11.

It should be noted that the consti-

tutional provision relied upon by the Court has been amended
three

times

since

the

1904

decision.
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The

constitutional

separation of state and local functions has been abolished and
the clear supervisory control of the State Tax Commission has
been reinforced.

In fact, much of the litany of potential abuse

cited by the Eldredge Court

(and by the Appellant) is now

constitutionally sanctioned by express language.

Eldredge thus

provides little guidance to this Court in determining questions
of state purpose and state taxation.
Act can be read

fairly without

In the case at hand, the

finding clear violations of

Article XIII, Section 5 or Article XIII, Section 11. The duties
and functions of each public official set forth in the Act come
within

and

are

consistent

with

the

respective

permitted duties for each such public position.

statutorily

(See, Utah Code

Ann. §59-1-210, general powers and duties of State Tax Commission; Utah Code Ann. §17-5-52, -53, -54, duties of Board of
County Commissioners; Utah Code Ann. §67-3-1, general functions
and duties of State Auditor; Utah Code Ann. §67-4-1, general
duties of State Treasurer.)
In 1925 the Court again considered an Article XIII
Section 5 challenge to a law providing for agricultural extension services throughout the state.

In Bailey v. Van Dyke, 240

P.454 (Utah 1925), the Court upheld a law authorizing county
commissions to enter contracts for state agricultural extension
services with local taxes.
Certain distinctions between Bailey and the present
case should be noted
issues.

for proper

understanding

of the real

In Bailey, local governments could, at their option

enter into contracts for agricultural extension services.

A

local decision supported by a local tax would result; no section
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of the Constitution was violated.

The Appellant contends that

Bailey would prohibit requiring that taxes be imposed to fund
the administration of the property tax system.

Such a con-

tention ignores the statewide public purpose addressed by the
Act.

In the present case, a legislatively defined statewide

concern required a statewide remedy and it is well settled that
the

Legislature

in

furtherance

of

a

statewide

require the imposition of local tax levies.

purpose

may

Such is the case

with the analogous Uniform School Fund levy described above.
Appellant

also

seeks

support

County, 63 P. 2d 259 (Utah 1936.)

in

Smith

v.

Carbon

The Act under review by the

Smith Court involved the imposition by county clerks of probate
fees graduated according to the size of the estate.

At the

outset it must be noted that Smith was not an Article XIII, §5
case.
dicta.

The only reference to that provision is a passing one—in
The case largely revolved around whether the probate

charge was a "fee" or a "tax."

The Court concluded that it was

a "tax" which, because of -its graduated nature, violated the
uniform and equal provisions.

As the Article XIII §5 issues

were not briefed the Court didn't address them.

Thus the case

is of little support to the Appellant since there is clear
authority

for sustaining

the power of

the State

to impose

burdens on local government and require the imposition of taxes
to pay for them.

The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 285

P.1001-1004 (Utah 1930.)
Finally, Appellant relies on The Best Foods, Inc. v.
Christensen, 285 P.1001 (Utah 1930) for the proposition that the
current Act

intrudes

impermissibly
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into the right of local

self-government.

In Best Foods, a legislative requirement that

local officials grant and sell permits prior to allowing commercial trade of oleomargarine was upheld even though the local
governments were directed to charge and keep the administrative
fees allowed.
local

While the Court stated that the "very essence of

self-government/1

was

the power
Id.

collect and control revenues,

of municipalities

at 1003.

to

it upheld the act

first stating clearly the rule that a statute must be found
constitutional

if

susceptible

to

a

valid

interpretation.

Second, the Court found that the Legislature acted well within
its power in imposing a duty on local governments to assist the
state in enforcing the Act and furthering a statewide purpose.
Id. at 1004.

The Court also noted that the Legislature may,

under settled authority, impose on counties the duty to impose
taxes other than for its own purposes.

Ixi. at 1004.

This

reasoning applies with equal force in the instant case where
property tax administration has been the subject of extensive
legislative

control

and

state

financial

and

administrative

involvement.
While these early decisions by this Court strictly
construed

the

constitutional

restriction

on

the

Legislature

vis-a-vis local governments1 sovereignty, the Court has taken a
far more pragmatic approach in later years.
stress

the

enactments

importance
responding

of
to

granting
statewide

These later cases

deference

to

legislative

concerns, even when

the

concerns may initially appear as localized issues.
In Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah
1975) the Court considered the Article XIII Section 5 challenge
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to

the

alleged

Utah

Neighborhood

that the

state's

Development
diversion of

Act,

Plaintiffs

locally

had

assessed and

collected property taxes to a local redevelopment agency's use
was unconstitutional.

Finding

the act to have a statewide

purpose, the facial appearance of local benefits accruing to an
agency controlled by a Board of Directors composed of the Salt
Lake City Council occurring at the instance of a legislative act
was not controlling.

To respond to a statewide concern, blight-

ed areas, "the law is well settled that in exercising the powers
of the state the Legislature may

require the revenue of a

municipality, raised by taxation, to be applied to uses other
than that for which the taxes were levied."

.Id. at 504.

The holding in Tribe is important to the present case
because it properly recognizes the Legislature's authority to
recognize a legitimate statewide purpose (i.e., respectively, to
rid localities on a statewide basis of blighted areas, Tribe;
and create an efficient statewide property tax assessment ,
collection

and

distribution

mechanism,

and

the

concomitant

authority to require imposition of a tax for or the diversion of
local revenue to that identified specific statewide purpose.
Following Tribe, in Salt Lake County v. Murray City
Redevelopment, 598 P.2d

1339

(Utah

1979),

this Court again

upheld the Utah Neighborhood Redevelopment Act and found the
diversion of locally assessed taxes to the Murray City project's
use as a proper exercise of the state's power to tax for the
benefit of the public at large.

The Salt Lake County Court took

the opportunity to reaffirm its earlier conclusions in Tribe.
The Legislature is empowered to redirect the tax revenues of
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local governments for purposes it has concluded are statewide
concerns.

Additionally, the Court pointed out that the Plain-

tiff Salt Lake County was not deprived of its taxes to the sole
benefit

of Murray

collect taxes
intact.

City,

The

Countyfs

"power

to

assess

and

for all purposes of such corporation" remained

]jd. at 1343.
These two recent cases clearly demonstrate the Court's

approval

of

taxing

mechanisms

created

by

the Legislature

to

resolve identified statewide concerns such as that faced in the
present case.

Even earlier cases relied on by the plaintiffs

reference the principle of state purpose as justification for
legislatively
taxes.

These

imposed
later

taxes or diversions of locally assessed
cases

clearly

note

the overriding

state

purpose and uphold the legislative acts satisfying that definition.

There is no intimation by the earlier courts that if in

fact a statewide purpose were at issue the acts would not have
been upheld.
The Utah

Supreme

Court has

recently

and

succinctly

stated the roles of the judiciary and the Legislature relative
to public purpose enactments.
Due respect for the legislative prerogative in
law making requires that the judiciary not
interfere with enactments of the Legislature
where disagreement is founded only on policy
considerations and the legislative
scheme
employs reasonable means to effectuate a
legitimate objective.
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d

406, 412

(Utah 1986), citing Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979).
Continuing in this narrative, the UTFC Court, citing with favor
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its opinion in Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184
(Utah 1984) states:
[A]cts of the Legislature are presumed constitutional, especially when dealing with economic matters based on factual assumptions. It
is only when a legislative determination of
public purpose is so clearly in error as to be
capricious and arbitrary that the judiciary
should upset it. Allen v. Tooele, supra.
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson,
723 P.2d 406, 412-413 (Utah 1986).
And finally, the Court described the nature of public purpose.
What is public purpose varies and changes with
the times. In 1890, it was held that the
purchasing and operating of an electrical
distribution system to supply electricity to
homes was not a public purpose. Maudlin v.
City Council of Greenville, 33 S.C. 1, 11 S.E.
434 (1890) . In contrast, in the past twelve
years we have found public purpose in industrial development by a county, Allen v. Tooele
County, supra; eradication of urban blight by
a quasi-municipal corporation, Tribe v. Salt
Lake City; and the providing of funds for lowand moderate-income housing by a state agency.
Utah Housing Finance v. Smart, supra. We
cannot say in the face of those precedents
that the stimulation of Utah's economy and the
creation of employment is not a legitimate
public purpose.
It is closely related to
industrial development and not different in
kind.
Whatever our private views on the
matter might be, we must concede that the
Legislature's determination that a public
benefit would result was within its latitude.
Id. at 413.
The Appellants, at great length, reiterate that the
uniform levy to defray the costs of collecting and assessing
property taxes created pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§17-19-15

(Supp. 1988) constitutes a legislative imposition of a local tax
for purely local purposes in violation of Utah Const. Art. XIII,
§5.

Ignoring the long history of State involvement and super-

vision over the property tax assessment and collection process,
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it based its argument almost exclusively upon the fact that
assessment and collection functions are performed by County
elected officials.

The argument is simply that if County

officials perform these services, they must be County purposes
and accordingly Utah Constitution, Article XIII, §5 must be
violated.

Such an argument ignores the historical development

of counties, the relationship of counties to the State and the
dual obligations of County officials in performing both State
and purely local functions.
visions of the State.

In Utah, counties are legal subdi-

Utah Const. Art. XI, §1.

They are

organized and created by general lav;. Utah Const. Art. XI, §4.
They are not municipal corporations of purely local character as
defined in Utah Const. Art. XI, §5.

This distinction is impor-

tant in the instant case since the Utah Supreme Court in Salt
Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 560, 564 (Utah 1913)
defined a "state purpose" for Article XIII §5 analysis as one
"for the general public good, and not for a private purpose;
that such purpose is not one which pertains to the corporate
powers or interests of Salt Lake City."

The critical question

is then whether purely local self-government is affected.
There, as in the instant case, "the state, ...simply calls upon
its agencies, the counties, and the cities to assist in discharging a public duty which in no way affects local selfgovernment."

Id. at 564.

Counties, as legal subdivisions of

the State act as instrumentalities of the State in effecting
State purposes.

The State uses the County as its agent in the

discharge of the State's functions and duties.

Specific exam-

ples of this role are found throughout Title 17, Utah Code
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Annotated.
party.

Sheriffs must serve all process when the State is a

§17-22-26, Utah Code Anno. (1953 as amended.)

County

Attorneys must conduct on behalf of the State all prosecutions
for public offenses within counties.

They must attend to all

legal business required by the Attorney General, without charge,
when the interests of the State are involved.
Code Ann. (1953 as amended.)

§17-17-1, Utah

County Assessors, in cooperation

with and under the supervision of the State Tax Commission, must
perform all the duties mandated by Tax Commission Rule, the
Legislature or the Constitution.

Utah Const., Art. XIII, §11,

and §17-17-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended.)

Based upon this

mix of delegated State responsibility and the County quasimunicipal police powers over purely local matters, Appellants
err in suggesting an interpretation of Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5
that ignores these differences.

The State of Utah has a long

history of involvement in and supervision over property tax
assessment and collection matters.
dents1 Brief).
ment functions.

(See Point 11(A) of Respon-

The State has paid for many of the local assessAs early as 1917 the State, with State general

fund revenues, was obligated to pay a proportionate share of the
costs of collecting and assessing property taxes.

Compiled Laws

of Utah, 1917, §1561, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, §19-16-16,
and §19-16-16 Utah Code Ann. 1943.

Specifically, those statutes

provided "the sum (of the assessing and collection costs) so
apportioned to the state and the state school funds shall be
borne and paid by the state..."

Clearly, the state could not

legally expend state funds unless the expenditures were for
state purposes.
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Finally, this Court has recently addressed the standards that must be applied in determining whether a function is
a "municipal function" or a "State function."

In City of West

Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board, 98 Utah Rpt. 37, (Utah,
1988), this Court addressed whether the provision of retirement
benefits was a municipal function, whether the Utah State
Retirement Board was a special commission, and whether the
legislative grant of authority over retirement benefits to the
State Retirement Board constituted a delegation of municipal
functions to a special commission in violation of Utah Const.
Art. VI §28.

In defining "municipal function" the Court reject-

ed the sort of strict categorization which the appellant would
urge upon it and adopted a balancing approach.

The Court, Id.

at 40, enumerated some of the specific factors as:
"[The] relative abilities of the state
and municipal governments to perform the
function, the degree to which the performance
of the function affects the interests of those
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and
the extent to which the legislation under
attack will intrude upon the ability of the
people within the municipality to control
through their elected officials the substantive policies that affect them uniquely."
In the present case, the funding mechanism adopted by
the Legislature specifically recognized

and addressed the

disparity in tax base between the various counties of the state.
Just as with public education and the Uniform School Fund, many
of the counties of the state lack the ability to fund wholly
from their own revenues efficient and modernized property tax
assessment and collection systems.

By providing a uniform

state-wide tax rate the ability to perform the constitutionally
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mandated responsibilities was extended to all counties, not just
those with rich tax bases.

Failure of counties to perform those

functions affects not just taxpayers within the non-performing
county, but all other taxpayers in the state through their
contribution to the Uniform School Fund and the equalized
funding of public education.

Little is served in terms of

meeting the constitutional mandate of equality of uniformity and
assessment if only those counties which have adequate tax bases
are properly assessed.

Finally, the question must be resolved

as to whether the statutory funding scheme "intrudes upon the
ability of the people within the county to control through their
elected officials the substantive policies that affect them
uniquely."

As a general matter no element of the assessment and

collection process affects local taxpayers uniquely.

To the

degree that the properties are mis-assessed, the state as a
whole assumes liability for lost revenues in the Uniform School
Fund and federal litigation under the Railroad Revitalization
and Recovery Act.

Appellant asserts that the Act strips from

local elected officials not only control over how they perform
their official responsibilities, but also control over the whole
taxation process and the levels of funding afforded those
activities.

That simply is not the case.

The Legislature has

uniformly mandated the functions of local officials as they
relate to the property tax system.

They largely act as agents

for the state in the ad valorem taxation process.

The levels at

which they are compensated and at which they set their programs
remain uniquely within local control.

They remain subject to

their local constituents in all matters respecting the size of

30

their offices and budgets and the efficiency with which they
perform their functions.

To the extent they believe it locally

necessary to expend funds for functions other than those contained within the uniform budgeting categories adopted by the
State Auditor, they retain complete ability to pay for those
functions out of other county revenues.

This is no more nor

less the case than currently exists with the Uniform School Fund
and the local Uniform School Fund Levy imposed in each school
district.
While the foregoing is in the context of an Art. VI,
§28 discussion, the elements of municipal functions under that
provision and "local purposes" under Art. XIII, §5 are closely
intertwined.

The balancing test established by the Court for

determining whether something is "a municipal function" is
equally applicable in determining whether an activity is a
"local purpose."

In each case the pervasive pattern of state

activity and control over the assessment, collection and distribution of property taxes renders those functions as something
more than "local purposes" or "municipal functions."

They are

not "substantive policies that affect them (the County uniquely."

West Jordan, Id. at 40.
It is settled law in this State, as in all juris-

dictions throughout the Country, that the Legislature possesses
the authority to require local governments to impose taxes or
spend funds raised by taxes to effect state-wide purposes.
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah
1975); Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d
1339, 1343 (Utah 1979).

Appellant chooses to ignore this
31

mandatory aspect of Tribe and Salt Lake County.

Also ignored is

the simple reality that counties annually budget, levy, and
expend millions of dollars in the performance of duties mandated
by the State Legislature as part of comprehensive Legislative
schemes for effecting State policy.

State offenses are pros-

ecuted, state Courts are supported, state statute violators are
incarcerated, and state standards for assessing and collecting
property taxes are complied with, all by County officials, all
with local property tax dollars, and all pursuant to comprehensive State mandated policies.

As noted in a leading treatise on

County law," ... Everywhere, even in states having the aforementioned constitutional clause, (referring to a constitutional
provision identical to Article XIII, §5 of the Utah Constitution) , it is agreed that state legislatures can impose taxes
upon counties for state purposes and can compel counties to
spend for such purposes even though taxation will be required."
(Emphasis supplied.)

Antieau, Local Governmental Law, §41.07.

Additionally, uniform and equitable property tax
assessment, collection and distribution has been a matter of
general public concern since statehood.

Equal and uniform

assessment is required by the Constitution.
the cost of statewide reappraisal programs.

The state has borne
Equalized levies

have paid for the development of local property assessment plat
maps.

The timing, sequencing, and performance of tax adminis-

tration duties by County officials are all subject to constitutional, statutory, and administrative control by the state.

To

suggest that the current Act violates local self-government or
constitutes legislative imposition of a tax for local purposes
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redevelopment agency for the purpose of alleviating the statewide problem of blighted areas.
in which

In the present case, counties

proceeds in excess of the budgeted amounts are gen-

erated by the uniform statewide tax administration levy have
those excess funds are diverted to other counties in furtherance
of funding programs leading to statewide uniformity of assessment and valuation.

Such a program does not necessarily consti-

tute revenue sharing between the counties, but merely a statewide funding approach to a matter of statewide concern.

Accord-

ing, Utah Const, art. XIII §5 is irrelevant to the discussion.
Even

assuming

arguendo

that

the

funding mechanism

prescribed by the Act constitutes revenue sharina between the
counties, plaintiff's challenge to the Act on that basis must
fail for several reasons.

First, if the Act only allows volun-

tary revenue sharing, the aggrieved parties are not the plaintiffs but those counties which object to the revenue sharing.
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claims on behalf of the
counties and accordingly its claim should be dismissed.

Second,

the clear factual evidence as set out in the Affidavit of Mr.
Gardner and the joint statement of the Utah Association of
Counties, Utah League of Cities and Towns and Utah School Boards
Association, clearly establish that the Act was supported by the
counties at the time of its passage.

R. 94-98.

Subsequently

the Utah Association of Counties, by resolution of all its
membership, or the executive committee authorized to speak for
it, has, on two separate occasions specifically endorsed S.B.
151

including

the

funding mechanism

established

thereunder.

Finally, the Utah Association of County Commissioners and County
34
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Nicholes v. Cherry, Judge, 60 P. 1103 (Utah 1900); Lehi City v.
Meiling, 48 P.2d 530, 534, 535 (Utah 1935).
In summary, Appellant's Utah Const. Art. XIII, §5
challenge to the Act as "involuntary revenue sharing" must fail.
Appellant lacks standing to challenge a provision that may only
be challenged by the affected governmental entities to wit, the
counties and, second, the record adequately supports that the
revenue sharing of the Act is fully supported and endorsed by
all 29 counties.
Simply

stated, Utah Const. Art. XIII

§5 does not

prohibit the diversion of local revenues to effect a statewide
purpose (Tribe and Salt Lake County, supra.).

Unless prohibited

by the Constitution, the power to legislate on matters of State
concern is vested in the Legislature.

Utah Const. Art. VI §1.

The 1983 amendment to Utah Const. Art. XIII §5, allowing voluntary revenue sharing between local governments is silent and
does not specifically prohibit the State from creating funding
mechanisms, even including horizontal revenue sharing, when a
statewide purpose

is involved.

Accordingly, Utah Code Ann.

§17-19-15, is a legitimate exercise of the reserved power of the
Legislature found in Utah Const. Art. VI §1 and is not prohibited by Utah Const. Art. XIII §5.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S "DUE PROCESS", "EQUAL PROTECTION"
AND "TAKING" CLAIMS ARE DEFECTIVE AS A MATTER
OF LAW AND RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
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occur with respect to a tax.

Fees are regulatory

The amount

collected

the cost of regulation must be

reasonably

related

to cover

to

the

service

provided

in nature.

pursuant

to

that

regulation.
Traits

common

to

fees

may

be

succinctly

noted

as

follows:
(1)

Fees

benefits

are

charged

the person

in

charged

exchange

as

for

opposed

to

a

a

service

benefit

that

to the

public at large.
(2)

Fees

are paid

by

choice

by the person

deciding

to

utilize government services.
(3)

Fees

are

collected

to

compensate

the

governmental

activity for the service provided.
Southview
Board

of

Cooperative

Cambridge,

Housing

396 Mass.

Corp.

395, 486

v. Rent

N.E.2d

Contro.

700, 704-705

(Mass., 1985).
On
general

purpose

Legislature
glance
noted

the

other

taxes

of government.

primarily

to bear

hand,

to

raise

are

Statutes
revenue

some of the hallmarks

several years ago, if there

Furthermore

it deems necessary

duly
may

to

fund

enacted
appear

of a fee.

the

by the

at

first

As the Court

is no attempt to regulate a

business or activity or protect a public
is a tax.

imposed

interest, the measure

the Legislature may impose whatever tax

and may require

local governmental

entities

to assess and collect the tax so long as the Legislature is not
specifically prohibited

from so doing.

Christensen, 285 P.1001, 1003-1004

The Best Foods, Inc. v.

(Utah, 1930).

Admittedly the

Legislature may choose to denominate a measure as either a fee
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guarantees.

If such were the case, there could be no rational

basis for sustaining taxes such as the Uniform School Fund Levy
or the Local Option Sales and Use Tax (a portion of which is
distributed on a per capita basis regardless of the jurisdiction
in which the taxpayer paid the tax.)

The two examples cited

above are denominated by statute as local levies or local taxes,
and have not been successfully challenged with respect to their
imposition or collection.

The funding mechanism set out in

§17-19-15 rests upon an equally strong constitutional footing.
Appellant's argument that it is denied the requisite
political voice with respect to taxation matters ignores the
requirements which have been established by the Utah Supreme
Court.
1935.)

See generally Lehi v. Meiling, 48 P.2d, 530, 536 (Utah,
Its

interest

in

avoiding

excessive

expenditures

is

identical to and represented by each and every taxpayer in the
State.

Appellant has the right to appear at budget hearings in

any county, it may protest the valuation placed upon its properties either by appeals to the State Tax Commission or local
boards of equalization, and finally, it may petition the Legislature for a change in the law.

Significantly, such a change

was sought in the 1988 general session and rejected by a decisive vote of that body.

Additionally, Appellant did not appear

at the 1987 or 1988 budget hearings of the Garfield County
Commission.

See Affidavit of Hazel Houston.

(R-216-219.)

Appellant further contends that its due process rights
are violated because it is centrally assessed by the State Tax
Commission, and the tax amount levied against it is not substantially equivalent to the burden it imposes or the benefit it
40
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raised by C o m m o n w e a l t h E d i s o n , the COM.- ^ . - . u a :
"Appellants u r g e , h o w e v e r , that the fourth prong of
the C o m p l e t e A u t o T r a n s i t test m u s t b e construed as
requiring a factual inquiry into t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
b e t w e e n t h e revenues generated by a tax and the costs
incurred on account of the taxed a c t i v i t y , in order to
provide a m e c h a n i s m for judicial d i s a p p r o v a l under t h e
C o m m e r c e C l a u s e o f state taxes that a r e e x c e s s i v e .
This asserti 01 1 r e v e a l s that a p p e l l a n t s labor u n d e r a
mi sconception about a c o u r t ' s role in cases such as
t h i s . T h e simple fact is that t h e a p p r o p r i a t e level
or rate o f t a x a t i o n is e s s e n t i a l l y a m a t t e r for
legislate " 5 , and n o t judicial , r e s o l u t i o n , "
The Court then w e n t on to n o t e , Id. 62 7:
"In ai ly e v e n t , the linchpin o f A p p e l l a n t s * c o n t e n t i o n
is the incorrect a s s u m p t i o n that t h e amount of state
taxes that m a y b e levied o n an a c t i v i t y connected to
Interstate C o m m e r c e is limited by t h e costs incurred
by the state o n a c c o u n t o f that a c t i v i t y . Only then
d o e s it m a k e sense t o a d v o c a t e judicial e x a m i n a t i o n o f
the relati onship b e t w e e n taxes paid and b e n e f i t s
Dvided.
B u t , as w e have p r e v i o u s l y noted, see
s u p r a , a t 6 2 3 - 6 2 4 , interstate commerce m a y be required
* •: c o n t r i b u t e to th€> costs o f p r o v i d i n g a l l g o v e r n .:Lal s e r v i c e s , including :.hose services from w h i c h
a r g u a b l y receives no J ire-:':: "benefit."
^

P e t r o l e u m \ . i\ev
25,

reaffirmed

p r* *

i-

Cotton

/IUXICU,

1989.
T h e r e I. s i 10 con s t i tut iona I r equ ir erne nt that the
b e n e f i t s received from, taxing authority by an ord.ina.ry
c o m m e r c i a l t a x p a y e r — o r by those living in t h e c o m m u nity w h e r e t h e taxpayer is l o c a t e d - - m u s t equal t h e
a m o u n t of its tax o b l i g a t i o n s . S e e K e y s t o n e B i t u m i n o u s
: i ial A s s n . v. D e B e n e d i c t i s , 480 U . S . 470 , 49] , n 21
(1 9 8 7) . A s w e r e c e n 11 y e xp 1 a i n e d i
11

[T] h e r e is no requii : • = .i v = nt u n d e r t h e D u e P r o c e s s
C J a use that., the a m o u i i t o f g e n eral revenue taxes
collected from a p a r t i c u l a r activity m u s t b e
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reasonably related to the value of the services
provided to the activity. Instead, our consistent
rule has been:
"Nothing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a class or upon individuals who
enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure, and who
are not responsible for the condition to be remedied.
"A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as we
have said, a means of distributing the burden of the
cost of government. The only benefit to which the
taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived
from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an
organized society, established and safeguarded by the
devotion of taxes to public purposes. Any other view
would preclude the levying of taxes except as they are
used to compensate for the burden on those who pay
them, and would involve abandonment of the most
fundamental principle of government—that it exists
primarily to provide for the common good. Carmichael
v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-523
(1937) (citations and footnote omitted.)
While Appellant does raise equal protection challenges
not raised by the Appellants in Commonwealth, Appellant's equal
protection rights are adequately safeguarded by the remedies
available to all taxpayers—including it.
It is clear that significant benefits flow to all
taxpayers of the State, be they centrally or locally assessed,
when properties are appropriately valued and tax values are
equalized so as to assure that each property is taxed only in
proportion to its value at an equal and uniform rate.

These are

indirect benefits which the Appellant receives by virtue of the
funding mechanism established in Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15.
Appellant wishes to dismiss these indirect benefits as of no
consequence in determining whether its equal protection or due
process rights have been violated.
Court spoke to that question as well.
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The Commonwealth Edison
Id. at 628 and 629:

"Furthermore, the reference in the cases to police and
fire protection and o t h er advant a ge s o f c i v i1i2 e d
society is not, as Appellants suggest, a disengenuous
incantation designed to avoid a more searching inquiry
into the relationship between the value of the benefits conferred on the taxpayer and the amount of taxes
it pays.
Rather when the measure of the tax is
reasonably related to the taxpayer 1 ? activities oi:
presence in the Stdte--from which it receives some
benefit such as the substantial privilege of mining
coa!-~the taxpayer will realize, m proper proportion
J
- -xci it pays, "(t)he only benefit tc which the
taxpayer is constitutionally entitled...!;) that
derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of lining
i11 an organized society, established and safeguarded
by the devotion of taxes to public purposes." Citing
with approval Carmichael v. Southern "-al and Coke
Company, >0? r\P..~7it 5 22'."
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indirect

JJUL

real

benefits from the system it attacks.

It has the equal pro-

tection and due process guarantees afforded it by the Constitution.
POINT V
APPELLANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT.
Article XIII, §5 analysis is ultimately not only a
legal analysis of the specific provisions of a challenged act,
but also a philosophical analysis of the fundamental inter-relationships between local and state governments.

Article XIII, §5

is predicated upon the assumption that remote state officials
should not force local elected officials to levy taxes for what
state officials might think are necessary local functions.

It

is a constitutional principle which speaks of co-existence, a
separation of responsibility and of direct accountability
between local elected officials and their constituents for
purely local decisions.

The thrust of the Appellant's claims is

that the Act violates Art. XIII, §5 by creating too great an
intrusion by the State into purely local affairs.

As the

keystone of Art. XIII, §5 is this inter-governmental relationship, Respondents respectfully submit that Appellant lacks
standing to assert the Art. XIII, §5 challenges.

The only

proper parties are the counties themselves and their elected
officials.

Respondent, Garfield County, voluntarily budgeted in

accordance with the Act and imposed the tax levy authorized
thereunder.

No challenge was made by Garfield County or any of

the 29 counties to the funding mechanism.

Appellant stands in

the position of any other taxpayer with respect to this issue.
Its benefits and burdens and the impact of the Act upon it are
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obtain

^° ^+• er

standing merely because more appropriate plaintiffs are absent•
It is clear from the analysis of the Art. XIII, §5 considerations that the only appropriate parties are the counties or
their elected officials.

The Appellant may not bootstrap itself

into their position merely by asserting their absence.
Finally, in Jenkins, the Court turned to the question
of whether "the issues raised by the plaintiff are of sufficient
public importance in and of themselves to grant him standing."
Id.

As a taxpayer, the Appellant is no different than any other

member of society.

Its personal interest in the Art. XIII, §5

issue of relative sovereignty and independence of state and
local governments is remote.

The doctrine of "great public

interest and societal impact" should not be applied.
In summary, the Pespondents assert that the Appellant
lacks standing to raise the constitutional questions framed in
the Art. XIII, §5 analysis.

Questions of the balance between

state and local autonomy, the ability of the State to mandate
functions in furtherance of State purposes and the requirement
of providing funding to support those services are appropriately
raised only by the local governments affected.

The Appellant's

interests are too remote and more appropriate plaintiffs exist.
It suffers none of the palpable injury which would traditionally
give rise to standing.

Accordingly, standing should be denied

and the judgment of the trial court sustained.
VI.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Senate Bill 151 was a result of several years of
county legislative efforts in pursuit of a solution to the
46
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:" b'tdte-

wide concern ignores both historical and current reality.

Under

Utah Const. Art. XIII, Section 5 as interpreted by the Utah
Supreme Court in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 540 P. 2d 499
(Utah 1975), and Salt Lake County v. Murray Redevelopment
Agency, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979), the funding mechanism established by the Act now under review is a permissible extension of
legislative authority in a matter of statewide concern.

It is

not a legislative imposition of the local tax for a purely local
purpose.
In conclusion, the funding mechanism and budgeting
mechanism are analogous to other funding mechanisms found in
Utah law.
levy.

It is directly analogous to the Uniform School Fund

Additionally the Act intrudes no further into local

government responsibilities than any other act previously
adopted by the Legislature delineating the structure and operation of the property tax system by local elected officials.
As such the Act should be sustained and the ruling of
the trial court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/j^day of jtfgM

1989.
PATRICK B. NOLAN
Garfield County Attorney
BILL THOMAS PETERS
Special Deputy Garfield County
Attorney
KARL L. HENDRICKSON
Special^BeplTEy G a r f i e l d

HENDRICKSON

Coun

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ^ii.tuED
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
Article VI, Section 1(1) of the Utah Constitution provides:
The Legislative power - * " ^ ?+-a*-° <-->-^~^ hp vp.si-ec:
1 ,.

In a Senate and House of Representatives wr.ic:. shall

be designated the Legislature - " *"he f:+-i+-° ^ f r4"--^
Article XIII, Section J . *" tiv- ••••jh .'•::stii..L^L

~ p?r+-

pi: c ^ ' ; Ar>~ *

(1) Ail tangible property in tl le state, i lot exempt ui ider
the laws of the United States, or under this Constitution,
shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to
:ts "aluv, to be ascertained as provi ded by 1 aw.
Art: "••-• "-Til, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution provides:
\if
. ,:<r Legislature shall provide by law a uniform, and
equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the
state, according to its value in money, except as otherwise
provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature
shall prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a
just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her, or its tangible property,, provided that
the Legislature may determine tl le manner and extent of
taxing 1ivestock.
Article XTXJ, Section 5 of the r*.ih Constitution provides:
The Legisiat •:: r- :--hal* .ti impose taxes for the purpose -.5
any county, city, town or other municipal corporation, but
may, by law, vest in the corporate authorities thereof,
respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all
purposes of such corporation. Notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained in this Constitution, political
subdivisions may share their tax and other revenues with
other political subdivisions as provided by statute.
Ax t i cl e XXJX, Secti oi i 11 of the Utah Consti tution provides:
There shall be a State Tax commission consisting o: .
members, not more than two of whom shall belong to the sa..;,e
political party. The members of the Commission shall be
appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of the
State, for such terms of office as may be provided by law.
The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the

tax laws of the State. It shall assess mines and public
utilities and adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of property among the several counties. It shall have
such other powers of original assessment as the Legislature
may provide. Under such regulations in such cases and
within such limitations as the Legislature may prescribe,
it shall review proposed bond issues, revise the tax levies
of local governmental units, and equalize the assessment
and valuation of property within the counties. The duties
imposed upon the State Board of Equalization by the Constitution and Laws of the State shall be performed by the
State Tax Commission.
In each county of this State there shall be a County
Board of Equalization consisting of the Board of County
Commissioners of said county. The County Boards of Equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within their respective counties, subject to such regulation and control by
the State Tax Commission as may be prescribed by law. The
State Tax Commission and the County Boards of Equalization
shall each have such other powers as may be prescribed by
the Legislature.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS;
The Statute that is the subject of this controversy is
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-19-15 which provides:
(1) To promote appraisal and equalization of property
values and effective collection and distribution of property tax proceeds, the county governing body of each county
shall annually separately budget for all costs incurred in
the assessment, collection, and distribution of property
taxes and related appraisal programs and submit those
budgets to the state auditor for review.
(2) The state auditor shall establish, by rule, categories
of allowable costs and shall certify submitted budgets for
compliance with approved categories.
(3) Upon review and certification by the state auditor,
the aggregated statewide costs shall be transmitted to the
State Tax Commission for determination of a mandatory
statewide tax rate sufficient to meet those expenditures.
By June 8 of each year the tax commission shall certify the
rate to each county auditor for inclusion upon the tax
notice as a separately listed and identified local levy.

2

(4) The tax rate may not exceed a maximum of .0005 per
dollar of taxable value of taxable property except for:
(a) mandated or formally adopted reappraisal programs
conforming to tax commission rules; or (b) actions required
to meet legislative, judicial, or administrative orders.
Taxes levied for this purpose may not be included in
determining the maximum allowable levy for the county or
any other taxing district.
(5) In the initial year that the levy adopted under this
section is effective, each taxing district within counties
which had not previously levied separate assessing, collecting, and distributing levies, shall reduce its property
tax levy by an amount equal to that paid by the taxing
district in the previous year for the cost of assessing,
collecting, and distributing taxes.
(6) Revenues received by each county from the levy authorized by this section in excess of the amount set out in
the certified budget shall be transmitted to the state
treasurer for equalization and distribution to the counties
in accordance with the certified budgets. Any revenue
excess resulting from an increase in collection rates upon
final settlement shall be deposited by the state treasurer
in a trust account to be adjusted against subsequent years.
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PATRICK B. NOLAN - #A 2422
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
BILL THOMAS PETERS - #A 2574
Special Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Garfield County Defendants
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

GARFIELD COUNTY
NO. -^HZS
FILED

JUL 13 1988
CLERK

<&s»#tf-

IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH CO.,
Plaintiffs,
-vsGARFIELD COUNTY: THE
GARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS:
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT,
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE,
COUNTY TREASURER: TOM
SIMKINS, COUNTY ASSESSOR;
THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION: R.H. "HAL"
HANSEN, ROGER 0. TEW,
G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE B.
PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSIONERS: TOM L. ALLEN,
UTAH STATE AUDITOR: EDWARD T.
ALTER, UTAH STATE TREASURER,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss.

AFFIDAVIT OF L. BRENT
GARDNER, SUBMITTED IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST
PLAINTIFF.

CASE NO. 3273

Judge Don V. Tibbs

L. Brent Gardner, being first duly sworn upon his
oath, and having personal knowledge of the following, deposes
and testifies as follows:
1.

That I am the Executive Director of the Utah Asso-

ciation of Counties.
2.

That I have been employed by the Utah Association of

Counties in that and other capacities since 1976.
3.

That among my principle duties on behalf of the Utah

Association of Counties is working with counties on property tax
assessment, collection and distribution matters, and drafting,
negotiating and representing counties before the Utah State
Legislature on issues relating to ad valorem tax matters.
4.

That in my capacity with the Utah Association of

Counties and because of my duties for the Utah Association of
Counties I am familiar with the subject matter of this litigation, in particular S.B. 151 (Utah Code Ann. §17-19-15, 1953 as
amended), prior legislative enactments relating to the assessment of property, and the collection and distribution of ad
valorem property taxes.
5.

I am familiar with the re-appraisal efforts which have

been undertaken to meet the needs of the 29 counties of the
State of Utah.
6.

That I was directly involved in drafting S.B. 151 and

negotiation and lobbying its passage.

7.

That S.B. 151 was a compromise measure between cities,

counties and school districts in the State of Utah over the
allocation of income derived from the investment of ad valorem
property tax revenues and the expenses related to property
assessment and tax collection in the 29 counties of the State.
8.

That S.B. 151 provided a funding mechanism to address

a matter of statewide concern in each of the individual counties
to wit: the accurate, equitable and fair assessment of locally
assessed residential, commercial and industrial properties and
the effective, efficient collection of ad valorem property tax
revenues.
9.

That I was personally aware that local assessment

levels had been challenged as inadequate in 7 consecutive years
of litigation by railroads wherein it was alleged that local
commercial and industrial properties were under-assessed; that
the State Tax Commission had issued orders to counties directing
them to increase assessment levels in the previous 4 years; and
that at least five lawsuits had been filed by the State Tax
Commission

against

local

County Assessors

alleging un-

der-assessment of locally assessed properties within their
respective counties.
10.

That as a result of my role in negotiating and draft-

ing S.B. 151, I am familiar with the duties assigned the State
Auditor and State Tax Commission.

11.

That the role assigned to the State Auditor was to set

forth categories of costs uniform throughout the State to be
utilized by County Commissions or councils in budgeting for the
costs of assessing properties and collecting and distributing ad
valorem tax revenues.
12.

That upon receipt of the county budgets broken into

the uniform categories, the State Auditor was to aggregate the
totals and submit that figure to the State Tax Commission which,
upon determination of the statewide assessed valuation, was to
calculate a tax rate sufficient to fund the aggregated budget
totals.
13.

Setting budgets, controlling costs through the budget-

ing process and expending funds was intended to and does remain
the responsibility of The Board of County Commissioners or
County Council.
14.

That the Utah Association of Counties, by formally

adopted resolution, in November 1987, expressed support for the
provisions of S.B. 151 and opposed any attempt to amend or
repeal its provisions.
15.

On or about January 15, 1988, the Utah Association of

County Commissioners and County Councils representing all 29
counties of the State of Utah unanimously expressed support for
the provisions of S.B. 151 including the revenue sharing provisions of the Act and opposition to any attempts to repeal or
amend the provisions thereof.

16.

That the attached letter dated February 24, 19 86, was

signed by Kennith L. Dallinga, President of the Utah Association
of Counties, who signed said statement in behalf of the Utah
Association of Counties.
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGJ
DATED this (^

C^/sizLl^-

day of

* 1988.

Utah Association of Counties
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /£rt
,

1988, personally

o*T- V ^ U z ^ / J^/A^rUA^

appeared

day of
before me

i the signer of the foregoing

instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

(J

JOTARY PUBLIC
PUBLK
NOTARY

Residing at: 9he^/-Q+<*£4u»s

c7

My Commission Expires:

OS//g/g?
BPD:A
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UTAH STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
UTAH STATE BOARD FOR VOCATIONAL EDUCATION
UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
M Richard Maxfieid
Chairman
Darlene C Hutchison
Vice Chairman

Linn C Baker
Neoia Brown
Keith T Checketts
Donald G Chnstensen

Ruth Hardy Funk
Valerie J Kelson
Margaret R Nelson

Bernarr S. Furse
State Superintendent
of Public Instruction
February 24, 1986

Honorable Representative Ted Lewis
Utah State House of Representatives
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Dear Representative Lewis:
S.B. 151, amended to provide for an equalized state levy,
represents a positive solution to the problem of payment for
assessing and collecting taxes. We support the concept and
urge the passage of S.B. 151.
Sincerely yours,

-Zfrti

r/Zt***^

UTAH STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION

UJJJJAAJ^

J^JIAAA^

UTAH SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION

UTAH LEAGUE O r C I / l V E S 6 TOWNS

/dtt
250 East 500 South • Salt Lake CjterUtak^4111 • Telephone: (801) 533-5431

GARFIELD COUNTY
PATRICK B. NOLAN - #A 2422
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
BILL THOMAS PETERS - #A 2574
Special Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Garfield County Defendants
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

NO. \3£%$

FILED

AUG 2 5 1988
^

UaZca22sL

CLERK

'm&vn-

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH CO.,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF L. BRENT
GARDNER, SUBMITTED IN
OPPOSITION TO CROSS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-vsGARFIELD COUNTY: THE
GARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS:
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT,
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE,
COUNTY TREASURER: TOM
SIMKINS, COUNTY ASSESSOR;
THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION: R.H. "HAL"
HANSEN, ROGER 0. TEW,
G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE B.
PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSIONERS: TOM L. ALLEN,
UTAH STATE AUDITOR: EDWARD T.
ALTER, UTAH STATE TREASURER,

CASE NO. 3273

Judge Don V. Tibbs

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss.

L. Brent Gardner, being first duly sworn upon his
oath, and having personal knowledge of the following, deposes
and testifies as follows:

1.

That I am the Executive Director of the Utah Asso-

ciation of Counties.
2.

That I have been employed by the Utah Association of

Counties in that and other capacities since 1976.
3.

That among my principle duties on behalf of the Utah

Association of Counties is working with counties on property tax
assessment, collection and distribution matters, including the
collection, collation and compilation of data submitted to the
Association by many of the 29 counties in the State of Utah
concerning assessment, collection and distribution of ad valorem
tax monies.
4.

That

in my capacity with the Utah Association of

Counties and because of my duties for the Utah Association of
Counties, I collected financial and budget data from the various
counties of the State of Utah concerning the costs associated
with the assessing, collection and distribution of ad valorem
tax monies.
5.

That based upon the data supplied to me by the County

Auditors from each county listed on the attached Exhibit A, I
prepared a summary and compilation of the full costs associated
with the assessment, collection and distribution of tax monies
for each of the counties identified on Exhibit A attached hereto
and by this reference incorporated herein.
6.

That the total of said full costs for the year 1985,

excluding Grand and Sevier County was $17,564,047.00.
7.

That attached hereto as Exhibit B, is a preliminary

recapitulation

of

settlements

and

-2-

costs

of

assessing

and

collecting property taxes for 1985 which was prepared by me from
data supplied to me by the County Auditor of each of those
counties identified on Exhibit B which recapitulation sets forth
in summary manner from the data received by me, the total costs
billed in 1984, the full costs as budgeted for 1985 and an
estimate of the final costs in 1985 based upon final settlement.
8.
was

That this preliminary recapitulation of settlements

prepared

personally

by me

from

data

in my

possession

supplied to me by each of the Auditors of the counties listed on
said Exhibit, and that said information was submitted by me to
the Utah State Legislature in connection with its review and
consideration of legislation relating to the cost of assessing,
collection and distributing ad valorem tax monies within the
State of Utah,
9.

That the information on Exhibits A and B is true and

correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
lis X%T~day of
DATED this
dlsU^/jJ^—,
^T~~day of *$<0*M44T~

^

^

*

^

19 88.

eiftft

L. BRENT GARDNER - Affiant
Utah Association of Counties

-3-

SUBSCRIBED

AND SWORN

(^^fUt^L^
ST. Y^LA-t-^^ ^a^ti^uisu

to before

me this

XS^

day of

, 1988, personally appeared before me
, the signer of the foregoing

instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires

,

X

Residing at; ?/ce-^iJ- y ^ ^ U ^

BPG:C

-4-

Zcta^A.

COUNTY
Beaver

2F0LL*B6I5«985
$

116,419

1985 ASSESSED
VALUATION
$

MILL LEVY

34,736,677

3.38

Box Elder

332,915

213,081,868

1.56

Cache

550,943

239,647,356

2.30

CarLcm

496,598

142,535,723

3.48

Daggett

61,991

16,327,977

3.80

1,293,996

585,295,146

2.21

Duchesne

431,142

242,111,612

1.75

Emery

474,430

280,440,279

1.69

Garfield

194,961

40,967,953

4.76

Grand

-

-

Iron

338,481

112,186,515

3.02

Juab

232,205

36,559,810

6.35

Kane

204,000

30,677,745

6.50

Millard

473,540

70,038,122

6.76

Morgan

87,169

27,146,090

3.21

Piute

41,313

Rich

.U0,576

33,314,634

3.32

6,000,000

3,540,308,051

1.70

San Juan

226,217

183,286,647

1.23

Sanpete

180,671

68,356,450

2.64

Sevier

-

-

Summit

440,533

674,878,147

.65

Tooele

414,786

121,102,212

3.43

Uintah

398,785

408,863,889

.98

1,937,224

860,164,705

2.25

Wasatch

204,301

57,646,046

3.54

Washington

436,826

177,274,258

2.46

Wayne

55,220

9,170,855

6.02

Weber

1,828,805

636,475,654

2.87

Davis

Salt Lake

Utah

6,210,584 '

-

6.65

-

PRELIMINARY RECAP OF SETTLEMENTS AND COSTS OF ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTY TAXES FOR 1985

xty

Final Settlement

rev

County levy with county retaining
all interest

Total*Costs
Billed^in 1984

Full-Costs_ as
Budgeted 1985,

Estimate of Final Costs
in 1985 Based on Final
Settlement

73,917

116,419

114,019

Phase in full costs over 4 years

179,325

332,915

213,989

le

County levy

222,489

550,943

550,943

Don

County levy with county retaining
all interest

200,662

496,598

363,933

gett

Phase in full costs over 3 years

30,619

61,991

43,372

is

Full costs plus payment of new
interest

395,431

1,293,996

953,380

hesne

Full billing unless schools demonstrate need for reduction at later
date

223,374

431,142

338,948

ry

Reduced costs/^qual to amount of
new interest (

234,577

474t430

415,519

-field

Full costs

89,594

194,961

194,961

md

Status Quo - no new costs, no
new interest

67.235

)n

Status Quo - no new costs, no
new interest

187,541

338,481

190,000

ab

Phase in full costs over 10 years

86,489

232,205

ne

Half year full costs starting in
January, 1986

88,021

204,000

95,138
146,010

Hard

Phase in full costs 101 first year,
30% second year on

215,716

473,540

241,498

rgan

Phase in full costs over 5 years
starting January, 1986

36,979

87,169

37,500

Elder

Page One

N/A

69,552

**&£

tty

Final Settlement

te
ti
t Lake
Juan
pete

Phase in full costs over 3 years
Phase in full costs over 10 years
County levy
Phase in full costs over 4 years
Full costs with payment of new
interest
County levy with county retaining
all interest
County levy
Full costs plus payment of new
interest
Phase in full costs over 3 years
Phase in full costs over 10 years
County levy
Status Quo\i\ - no
n( new costs, no
new interei
3St__
Full costs
Status Quo - no new costs, no
new interest

ier
mit
ele
tah
h
atch
hington
•ne
>er

Total Costs
Rilled in 1984
19,387
59,252
-2^184x202 /,*W,
79,613
125,864
111,271

Full Costs as
Budgeted in 1985
41,313
110,576
03£> 6,000,000
226,217
180,671
N/A

Estimate of Final Costs
in 1985 Based on Final
Settlement
26,997
65,177
6,000,000
124,840
153,267
100,000

205,408
187,933

440,533
414,786

287,083
314,055

182,321
989,012
140,198
222,389

398,785
1,937,224
204,301
436,826

324,830
1,087,913
159,427
222,400

21,000
958,102

55,220
1,828,805

38,110
958,102
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GARFIELD COUNTY
NO. J?-??*f , FILED

PATRICK B. NOLAN - #A 2422
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
BILL THOMAS PETERS - #A 2574
Special Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Garfield County Defendants
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

AUG 2 5 1988
CLERK

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH CO.,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF HAZEL HOUSTON,
GARFIELD COUNTY CLERK/
AUDITOR SUBMITTED IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION TO CROSS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-vsGARFIELD COUNTY: THE
GARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS:
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT,
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE,
COUNTY TREASURER: TOM
SIMKINS, COUNTY ASSESSOR;
THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION: R.H. "HAL"
HANSEN, ROGER O. TEW,
G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE B.
PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSIONERS: TOM L. ALLEN,
UTAH STATE AUDITOR: EDWARD T.
ALTER, UTAH STATE TREASURER,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF GARFIELD )

ss

CASE NO. 3273

Judge Don V. Tibbs

Hazel Houston, being first duly sworn upon her oath,
and having personal knowledge of the following, deposes and
testifies as follows:
1.

That I am

the duly elected, qualified

and acting

Garfield County Clerk/Auditor.
2.

That I have served in the capacity as Garfield County

Clerk/Auditor, since January 1, 1984.
3.

That among my duties as Garfield County Clerk/Auditor,

is to act as the Clerk of the meetings of the Garfield County
Commission, and in that regard keep the minutes of Commission
Meetings.

That attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit "A", are

the minutes of the Garfield
December 15, 1986.
the minutes

County Commission meeting held

Further, attached hereto as Exhibit "B" are

of the Garfield

County Commission meeting held

December 14, 1987.
4.

That in my capacity as Clerk/Auditor

for Garfield

County, I caused to be published notice of the meetings of the
Garfield County Commission, and in particular, I caused to be
published a public notice of the public hearing of the Garfield
County budget for the calendar year 1988, and further published
notice inviting anyone wishing to examine the tentative budget
to do so in the Office of the County Clerk during the hours of
9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday
through Friday.
as Exhibit

A copy of said public notice is attached hereto

fl

C", and by this reference incorporated herein.

2

5*

That

further,

Clerk/Auditor, I caused

in

my

capacity

as

Garfield

County

to be published a public notice of

budget opening, wherein Garfield County would hold a budget
hearing for the purpose of opening the budget for the year
ending December

31, 1987, a copy of said public notice is

attached hereto as Exhibit "D" .
6.

That neither Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph

Company, nor any person identifying themselves as a representative of or for and in behalf of Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company, appeared at the hearing on the 1987 Garfield
County Budget, nor the hearing on the 1988 Garfield County
Budget.
7.

That the above and foregoing statements are true to

the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and as to
those matters stated upon information and belief, I believe the
same to be true.
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this %5^ day of

\\{\

nit 0 ^

/ 1988.

HAZfL/HOUSTON;
JTONj - Affiant
Garfield County Clerk/Auditor
SUBSCRIBED

IWkii

AND

SWORN

to

before

me

this

QSZ

da

Y

of

, 1988, personally appeared before me

PATRICK B. NOLAN -#A 2422
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
BILL THOMAS PETERS - #A 2574
Special Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Garfield County Defendants
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

GARFIELD COUNTY
NO. *

. FILED

AUG 25 1988

XI
I)*,JT>«

CLERK
A*.*M9USM^

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH CO.,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS HATCH,
CHAIRMAN, GARFIELD COUNTY
COMMISSION SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION TO CROSS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
GARFIELD COUNTY: THE GARFIELD
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS:
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT,
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY COMMISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE, COUNTY
TREASURER: TOM SIMKINS, COUNTY
ASSESSOR: THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION: R.H. "HAL" HANSEN,
ROGER 0. TEW, G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE
B. PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSIONERS: TOM L. ALLEN, UTAH STATE
AUDITOR: EDWARD T. ALTER, UTAH STATE
TREASURER,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF GARFIELD

)

ss.

CASE NO. 3273

Judge Don V. Tibbs

Thomas Hatch, being first duly sworn, upon his oath, and
having personal knowledge of the following, deposes and testifies
as follows:
1.

That I am a duly elected, qualified and acting Commissioner

for Garfield County having served in this capacity since January of
1985.
2.

That I am currently serving as Chairman of the Garfield

County Commission, having served in that capacity since January of
1986.
3.

Among the duties I perform as a Garfield County Commissioner

is the proposal and adoption of the annual County budget.
4.

That I participated in the adoption of the 1987 and

1988 Garfield County budgets.
5.

That in 1987 and 1988, the Garfield County Commission

voluntarily adopted a budget that separately accounted for and included
all costs associated with the assessing, collecting and distribution
of taxes as set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 17-19-27.
6.

That the adoption of said County budget including the

cost of assessing, collecting and distributing tax monies was voluntary
in all respects.
7.

In adopting said budget for the years 1987 and 1988,

the Garfield County Commission voluntarily consented to and approved
revenue sharing between and among the several counties of the State
of Utah for the years 1987 and 1988 and we thereby voluntarily approved
and imposed the tax levy set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section
17-19-27 upon all taxable property within Garfield County.

rJ3tr

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

DATED THIS j 5 , ' ^

DAY OF AUGUST, 1988,

Th6mas Hatch, Chairman
Garfield County Commission

On this the c*^ — day of August, 1988, personally appeared
before me, Thomas Hatch, the signer of the foregoing instrument and
acknowledged to me that he did execute the same.

(

^. iQmisfr

v

) K.^.T/YX.s)

Notary Public

My Commission Expires: of. . ^ ^

